

An African Success Story: Civil Society and the ‘Mozambican Miracle’

Introduction

Mozambique, described by Former President Bill Clinton in 2000 as the “world’s fastest growing economy,” (Smith, 2000) has come a long way since the end of its fifteen-year civil war, during which it earned the reputation as the country with the second-highest infant mortality rate in the world (United Nations, 1995). What is most striking about Mozambique’s post-conflict recovery is that the cessation of hostilities and a supportive international community have caused civil society (CS) to flourish.

The study of CS in the global North is nothing new, yet, civil society organisations and alliances have received much less attention in Africa. Of the African countries whose Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have strengthened democratic processes, demanded economic reform, and advocated for increased freedoms, Lusophone Africa has been largely overlooked. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, a lecturer in Political Economy at the University of London, states that mainstream IR academic thought has overlooked both Africa and its endemic distributive inequality (Jones, 2005).

This paper examines the label of ‘miracle’ applied to Mozambique’s post-conflict development. Specifically, this paper looks at the role that Mozambique’s CS has played in the country’s recovery after its 15-year civil war and reconsiders both the inherent bias against non-voluntary associational institutions in the CS discourse and the use of the label ‘miracle’ to describe economic and societal development in the developing world.

In order to appraise civil society’s role in the country’s rehabilitation and development I will first briefly summarise Mozambique’s historical experience. Understanding Mozambique’s historical context explains its tumultuous post-colonial and civil war experiences.

Secondly, I will tie Mozambique’s historical experience to the long-term effects of its recent civil war. This paper will demonstrate that CSOs have been fundamental to restoring societal confidence and normalcy to a country in which 5 million people were displaced and more than 1 million killed over the course of a 15 year conflict (Thompson, 1999).

Besides examining the long-term effects of Mozambique’s civil war, I will define civil society in a Mozambican context by first introducing Bhikhu Parekh and Chris Hann’s criticisms of the ‘Western’ focus of CS. Furthermore, I will explain Mozambique’s CS arena in terms of Michel Foucault’s attack on civil society and Antonio Gramsci’s observation that a government may sustain itself by co-opting civil society in order to provide itself greater legitimacy amongst its populace (Harbeson, 1994). Although Peter Ekeh’s assertion that many African societies have two parallel public spheres that interact with their singular private sphere is useful when analysing civil society in varying African states, his model does not strictly apply to the Mozambican context. Mozambique’s electoral system, though criticised by CSOs and opposition political parties alike, invalidates the existence of Ekeh’s bifurcated public spheres.

Thirdly, I will examine the role of Mozambican tradition and spiritual beliefs in the reconciliation and peace process. Several subsidiary questions will highlight the importance of a unique Mozambican psyche and regenerative culture in the country’s post-conflict process.

Fourthly, I will explore the importance of associational society and CSOs in Mozambique’s reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Despite the heavy UN presence, chiefly organised through ONUMOZ, strategic

planners within the Mozambican government and motivated Mozambicans in the public sphere worked to strengthen the nation's communal fabric, expand democracy-building efforts, and better distribute opportunities and services across the country.

Multilateral and international development organisations, such as the UNDP, the WFP, and the UNHCR, worked to rebuild roads, feed the malnourished, and re-settle internally displaced persons (IDPs), yet they were not the only organisations rebuilding the devastated country. Others have also worked tirelessly to restore hope in Mozambique. They include for-profit international development consulting firms, such as RONCO; bilateral international development donors, such as USAID and DFID; Mozambican religious organisations, including the Catholic Church and the Mozambique Christian Council of Churches (CCM); transnational civil society partnerships; small niche non-profit organisations – a good example is Bart Weetjens's HeroRat de-mining and tuberculosis detection company; and local grassroots Mozambican organisations, such as Feliciano dos Santos's band *Massukos* and his UK-partnered *Estamos Organização Comunitária*.

This paper will examine the assumptions that Mozambique's post-conflict economic and societal recovery has been a short-term marvel and that in the long-run it may fail to break with a cycle of economic dependency and ongoing indebtedness. Finally, I posit that the co-option and involvement of certain CSOs in Mozambique's political process has set Mozambique on a path of established peace and political transparency.

The Mozambican Civil War and its Effects

Background

Portugal's settlement and colonisation of East Africa followed Vasco da Gama's landing on the shores of Mozambique in 1498 (Duffy, 1962). Intermittent Portuguese trade and habitation would, at times, stretch from present-day Beira to Mombasa. Generally, however, Portuguese inroads along the present-day Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines were met with resistance from the mixed local populations whose trade with Arabian, Indian, and Persian merchants was threatened by the Portuguese presence.

A *prazero* system – based on the economic dominance achieved by Portuguese given large land-grants (*prazos*) by the Crown – served to extract wealth from the native inhabitants through exploitative means. Often, the *prazeros* ignored their pledge to the Crown to develop their lands, and instead amassed wealth by exacting taxes from petty chiefs on their lands, trading in ivory, and selling natives into slavery (Duffy, 1962). The result preserved an underdeveloped condition in which wealth was generated through exploitative means.

The *prazero* system entrenched a habit of developmental neglect that continued throughout Mozambique's colonial experience. Not only did the system impede the introduction of productive rural agricultural techniques, but it also hampered the development of transport and communication across the country. The location of the colony's capital, Lourenço Marques, at the territory's southernmost extremity did not improve the dire state of under-development (Newitt, 2002).

In the outlying and less-populated areas of the colony, the *prazero* system entrenched exploitative labour practices. Initially, exploitation was evident in the sale of slaves to American, Brazilian, French, and Spanish slave-traders (Duffy, 1962). Mozambican labour continued to be traded as a commodity throughout 20th century Portuguese colonial administration. Although no longer based on coercion and enslavement, it developed into a "...pattern of labour migration" that saw rural Mozambican men recruited to work in Witwatersrand Rand mines (near present-day Johannesburg) (Newitt, 2002).

Although Portugal generally failed to develop communications and transportation infrastructure, it did invest in various infrastructural schemes. This selective investment, coupled with the colony's commoditisation of labour, meant that "...Mozambique had a relatively diversified economy with an export potential to earn

foreign exchange [and]... a well-developed system of hydroelectric power” (Newitt, 2002, p. 188). The colony’s burgeoning economic capacity and well-endowed hydroelectric infrastructure looked set to ensure the smooth transition from an impoverished colony to a productive nascent state. Unfortunately, a protracted conflict suspended the country’s economic development.

Although African nationalism began to reify in Portugal’s African colonies in the 1940s and 50s, it was not until early 1960 that nationalist sentiment evolved into conflict (Chicolte, 1967). The resistance began in Angola in 1961 as a challenge to Lisbon’s “...claim of racial harmony based on miscegenation and civilizing policy...” (Chicolte, 1967, p. 43). During the 1960’s Portugal faced mounting resistance to its colonial rule.

Initially, CSOs were established in Portugal to provide Mozambicans a channel to discuss Lisbon’s administration of the colony. Although some CSOs were established with the co-optive goal of assimilating black and mulato Mozambicans (such as the *Associação Africana* and the *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique*), most CSOs established to voice Mozambican interests were controlled by Mozambicans born of European parents (Chicolte, 1967). As these organisations began to criticise Mozambique’s un-representative colonial administration and to urge reforms, the Mozambican colonial administration reacted by further diminishing democratic representation in the colony (Chicolte, 1967).

A shift towards un-representative administration and a crack-down on ‘subversive’ intellectuals in Lisbon led to the exodus of nationalist African intellectuals to Paris and to a strengthening of African nationalist ideology. Ronald Chicolte stated that, while it was unclear what the result of such a strengthening of ideology would be, “...it [was] safe to assume... that circumstantial events, influenced greatly by Portuguese intransigent policies, awakened the privileged African intelligentsia to challenge the Portuguese hegemony in Africa” (1967, p. 52).

In 1962 Mozambican intellectuals in Europe, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi were invited by Julius Nyerere to a conference in Dar es Salaam to form the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), which would become the main Mozambican liberation movement (Newitt, 2002).

Although most of the FRELIMO leadership cadre hailed from the more prosperous southern part of the country and was distrusted in the Northern provinces, the initial heavy-handed Portuguese response to FRELIMO operations led to a growth of peasant support. In fact, middle-class peasants, “...whose ranks were both increased and frustrated by the Portuguese, backed [FRELIMO] on the assumption that an independent Mozambican state would eliminate the constraints that the colonial administration had erected” (Bowen, 2000, p. 6). The insurgency continued into the mid 1970’s and considerably sapped Portuguese military morale as it drew the army into a seemingly unwinnable war.

Malyn Newitt suggests that when Portugal suddenly cast off its colonies in 1974, FRELIMO effectively gained power without popular support, thereby guaranteeing an outbreak of war in the nascent state. Newitt states that FRELIMO was viewed as an illegitimate government by large portions of the population, especially in the Northern provinces, since most of its leadership had been educated abroad and was native to developed areas closer to Maputo (2002).

Two significant events occurred in 1977, two years after Mozambican independence. FRELIMO announced that it would pursue a strategy based on Marxist-Leninist organisational philosophy (Newitt, 2002) – which immediately made it an enemy of the Apartheid South African regime, Southern Rhodesia, and of the United States of America. It also effectively undermined the limited CS arena that had existed in Mozambique during its late colonial period and early years of independence. FRELIMO absorbed certain sectors of CS by creating “...youth, women’s, and workers’ organisations” – including the *Organização de Juventude Moçambicana* (OJM) and the *Organização de Mulheres Moçambicanas* (OMM) (Newitt, 2002, p.198).

As FRELIMO tightened its grip on Mozambican society and crushed dissent within its armed forces, dissatisfaction began to spread. After a coup attempt in 1976, FRELIMO sent dissident military commanders to ‘re-education camps’ (Serapiao, 2004). Two such commanders that managed to escape a re-education camp fled to Southern Rhodesia where they “...sought military support to fight the FRELIMO government.” Southern Rhodesia, only too happy to destabilise its Marxist neighbour which provided material and ideological support to its own home-grown freedom movement (Robert Mugabe’s ZANLA), helped establish the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) – headed by Afonso Dhlakama (Serapiao, 2004, p. 2-3).

FRELIMO has been criticised for implementing increasingly repressive tactics as RENAMO escalated the conflict. FRELIMO’s tactics of forced food cultivation, limiting the free movement of peasants, and its strategy of limiting funding of basic social services caused widespread urban and rural discontent (Bowen, 2000).

As the war dragged on and the populace found itself increasingly targeted, splinter armed factions emerged, threatening to drag a country teetering on the brink of collapse into a state of irreconcilable anarchy and depredation. The result was that conditions in the country worsened and civil society groups “...within and without Mozambique began to mobilise to bring about peace” (Moran and Pitcher, 2004, p. 511). Mozambique’s Catholic Church played an integral role in brokering a formal agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO that culminated in the signing of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords, and ultimately brought the country’s brutal civil war to an end (Moran and Pitcher, 2004).

Effects

The effects of the country’s 15-year civil war were devastating. When peace was finally achieved it became apparent that the country’s economic capability had been largely demolished and rural economic growth had been brought to a virtual stand-still (Thompson, 1999). From a total population of 16 million, 5 million people were displaced and approximately 1 million had been killed (Thompson, 1999). With the laying of over 2 million mines, large swaths of land were made inaccessible to farmers. The result of the widespread dissemination of landmines was 10,000 victims and perhaps hundreds of thousands more to food shortages created by the elimination of arable land from the state’s agricultural capacity (Thompson, 1999).

At the end of hostilities numerous international aid agencies, UN bodies, and NGOs were already operating in Maputo and in some of the other major urban centres – including Beira, Nampula, Tete, Quelimane, Inhambane, and Pemba. This allowed for the rapid marshalling and distribution of relief aid and the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects. The United Nations launched a peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation mission, officially named the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), to “...guide the country from armed conflict to democratic and peaceful elections” (“The United Nations and Mozambique”, 1995, p. 105). ONUMOZ’s mandate was approved in December of 1992 and the mission started to coalesce around the following core requirements: a) the need to remain impartial in order to fully support the peace process, b) the need to encourage the international community to live up to its responsibility to support the Mozambican recovery process, and c) the need to secure the country’s major transportation corridors in order to ensure that humanitarian efforts and inter-state trade could contribute to the stabilisation of the country (“The United Nations and Mozambique”, 1995).

In addition to the influx of aid organisations, international development contracting firms, and operations run by organisations, such as the World Bank, CSOs multiplied. Goodwill and a domestic need to rebuild, coupled with a massive injection of donor funding, allowed home-grown CSOs to flourish. Several projects were established to provide shelter, training, jobs, and food to the large number of orphaned and homeless children that roamed the streets of Maputo. The successful *Meninos de Mocambique* is an example one such organisation that runs a clinic for malnourished and ailing street children. The organisation receives funding from Street Child Africa, a UK-based charity (“Mozambique”, Street Child Africa).

Implications

The country's infrastructure was left in ruins and its morale severely diminished, but positively, the country's trauma allowed for a peaceful democratisation and development process. So, what are the implications of the civil war on Mozambican civil society? To answer this question, I start by disagreeing with Peter Ekeh's assertion that post-colonial Africa has two parallel public arenas with "different types of moral linkages to the private realm" which, in-turn explain how nepotism, tribalism, and ideological ties exist within a public sphere, while state-mechanisms continue to exist in a realm governed by a seemingly non-partisan and independent civil structure (Azaraya, 1994). Although Ekeh's observations are descriptive of many African states, they do not accurately describe the country's state of civil society due to Mozambique's particular experiences. That the FRELIMO government is scrutinised by the RENAMO opposition party has meant the Mozambican government has had to regularly agree to RENAMO and civil society demands for greater transparency.

Governmental compromises have included allowing CSOs to monitor election centres via computer video links, unfettered access to polling stations, and in vote counting with the National Elections Commission (CNE) (Nvunga, 2006). Such compromises ensure that nepotism, tribalism, and shared identities do not interfere in the public realm as they do in Angola, Nigeria, or Zimbabwe. Perhaps a further challenge to Ekeh's general observation is the fact that the cost of political cronyism and manipulation may be much higher for Mozambique's fledgling democracy than in Angola, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, which suffer from a lack of transparency, corrupt and nepotistic government, and tyrannical dictatorship, respectively. In 2005, Transparency International ranked Mozambique 97th out of 158 countries in its perceived level of corruption (Annual Report Transparency International, 2005). Maputo's ranking exceeded that of Luanda, Nairobi, and Harare – 151, 152, and 107, respectively (Annual Report Transparency International, 2005). According to the UN Supervision and Control Commission Chairman, Colonel Segala, RENAMO and FRELIMO "...soldiers [have] admitted to hiding weapons..." as insurance policies against possible breaches of good faith and democratisation (Vines, 1998, p. 193).

CS in the Mozambican Context

The dominant definition of CS is based on a Western approach that maintains civil society is found in an arena of 'voluntary association' independent of the economy, the state, and the domestic sphere (family life). Michael Waltzer, following in the tradition of Western CS scholars, talks of a realm of un-coerced human associations that include family, unions, universities, the press, churches, professional groups, NGOs, and social movements (Parekh, 2005, p. 19).

Baron Bhikhu Parekh, a Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and current Labour MP sitting in the House of Lords, insists that though the accepted definition of CS suffices when applied to specific case studies, it is "...culturally and historically specific and has... obvious limitations" (Parekh, 2005, p. 23). Lord Parekh further explains that since the current Western definition, promoted by governments and NGOs alike, insists that coercion and cooption – in the form of state, international, or commercial influence – results in the loss of legitimacy of a CS arena, this definition is of limited usefulness when defining CS in non-Western countries (Parekh, 2005).

In order to lay the framework for a Mozambican definition of CS, it is thus necessary to see the existence of an altogether non-coercive CS. This allows for an appreciation of "associations based on traditional allegiances, ties of blood, inherited loyalties or the 'accident' of birth – such as castes, clans, tribes, and ethnic and religious communities" (Parekh, 2005, p. 21). CS in different regions and countries should not be painted with the same broad strokes – nor should coercion or cooption be seen as intrinsically undesirable. In much of the developing world, society is deeply divided along tribal, caste, and religious lines. This is often the result of the external process of colonialism that drew borders along neat imaginary longitudinal and latitudinal lines. What is similar to the Western model is the fact that CS in Mozambique has fostered social cohesion.

Chris Hann expands on Lord Parekh's preliminary description of non-Western CS by further explaining that the exportation of CS (through the promotion of democracy or externally-funded and directed CS-strengthening projects) results in a neo-imperialist imposition of a liberal notion of CS and may actually 'abort' local processes of change and CS development (Hann, 2005, p.46). He further explains that therein lies the core of the anthropologic critique of CS exportation and promotion.

Leonardo Avritzer's discussion of the necessary role that CS has played in peripheral non-Western war-afflicted societies is especially useful when defining CS in Mozambique. Although Avritzer uses Perú as an example of a case where CS has created self-help structures in order to fill the void and "produce public goods" that are normally provided by the state in Western 'core' countries (Avritzer, 2005, p. 56). According to Avritzer, Perú experienced economic conditions that hampered the government's ability to collect taxes while a prolonged civil war resulted in the death of over half a million Peruvians (Avritzer, 2005). As a result, by 1994 CS groups had started to offer services such as "soup kitchens, milk providing groups, and mothers' clubs" (Avritzer, 2005, p. 56).

Similarly, Mozambique's civil war and the ensuing breakdown of the government's provision of public goods resulted in the formation of a uniquely Mozambican CS, which, in turn, resulted in the development of self-help structures for its populace.

Traditional Culture and Practices

Sergio Viera de Mello, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees during the ONUMOZ-led peacekeeping mission, often praised Mozambique for its unique culture – its "culture of peace" (Thompson, 1999). Although de Mello's statements are difficult to support empirically, they are significant in explaining the *Mozambican Miracle*.

De Mello's observations encompassed the success achieved by a variety of communal and culturally-specific re-integration and reconciliation approaches. These approaches included the reunification of child soldiers with their families, encouraging families to hold purification ceremonies aimed at separating a child's experiences and actions during the war from his/her role in the family (especially successful for the re-integration of girls forced into sexual slavery), and the reinforcement of social interaction as a means of reincorporating traumatised children into the communal arena.

During the 1980's, Mozambican relief organisations realised that the Western approach to rehabilitating the victims of the war that treated them as infirm and in need of a cure, did not seem to be effective in the Mozambican context. Instead, the Mozambican government devised a policy that a) focused on extending "...material assistance to vulnerable families so they could sustain their children" and, b) reuniting separated children with their families as expediently and inclusively as possible (Thompson, 1999, p. 199). To achieve the latter strategy, *curandeiros* (traditional healers) stressed the concept of family strength over the Western notion of trauma as pathology (Thompson, 1999). In this way, *curandeiros* performed cleansing ceremonies in which they purified the houses and, at times, the returning children as a way of divorcing the inflicted trauma from the present child-family relations.

In addition to the role of *curandeiros*, programs aimed at healing wounds at the grassroots level have proven widely successful. Examples of such programs included "...the performance of plays and dances that condemned the war, peace marches, conciliatory soccer matches between the opposing sides, and special ceremonies to heal and reintegrate victims of the war into their communities" (Moran and Pitcher, 2004, p. 511). Feliciano dos Santos's *Estamos Organizacao Comunitaria* serves as an example of one such NGO that focuses on educating communities about social issues, such as communicable diseases, the need to improve sanitary health, and reconciliation through music. As dos Santos and his band *Massukos* tour through rural villages, they pause to give demonstrations of latrine construction and play their latest songs that explain how HIV-AIDS is spread (Pryor, 2008).

In addition to reconciliation and re-integration mechanisms and grassroots educational programmes, spiritual practices and traditions have played an important role in kick-starting the *Mozambican Miracle*. In Zambézia province Manuel Antonio began a movement that came to be known as the *Naparama* ('irresistible force'), which managed to secure the release of hostages held by RENAMO and establish 'neutral zones' while the war raged on ("Profiles", Conciliation Resources online). The movement tapped into the strong animist traditions in the Mozambican countryside. Its members "...relied on magic potions and other forms of 'spiritual protection' to render themselves 'invincible'..." in the face of RENAMO forces – which would often voluntarily accede to *Naparama* demands ("Profiles", Conciliation Resources online, para. 21).

To borrow from the Neo-Gramscian school, CSOs that tapped into Mozambican societal traditions and social mechanisms managed to restore an important "social glue" that has, very likely, served to further support the country's reconciliation and development. Neo-Gramscians stress that "social glue", a cohesive element between divergent interests, can be found in the "...shared negative experience of the effects of global capitalism" (Shilliam, 2008, ch. 9). Although, CSOs in the Mozambican context have not been brought together by a shared dislike for capitalism, a shared negative experience has allowed Mozambican CSOs and portions of the public sector to cooperatively heal the country's traumas. Moreover, the trauma experienced by 15 years of brutal civil war has produced the "social glue" that has helped Mozambicans avoid a return to conflict even in the face of numerous domestic challenges.

Economic Dependence and Surrogacy & CS Co-option and Stability

Samir Amin pointed out that by integrating itself into the international economic system, at the behest of its foreign donor states, Mozambique may actually be undermining its future independence and potential development (Schraeder, 2004). By accepting foreign loans, Maputo may be weakening its sovereignty (at worst) or bargaining power (at best). Furthermore, it is likely that if its economy fails to achieve the level of growth predicted by its economists, Maputo will find itself caught in a cycle of debt. Periodic debt relief has alleviated some of these concerns.

Furthermore, Stephen Thomas has argued that a growing dependence on steady flows of foreign development aid meant for CSOs has created a "...degree of surrogacy and substitution of the government's role" (Thomas, 1992, p. 43). This surrogacy threatens to undermine the function of the state. If residents of Sofala Province do not receive services from either the central government in Maputo or the regional government, and instead receive assistance from the UNDP and WFP, they have little incentive to pay taxes or vote in national elections. Furthermore, such surrogacy may alienate the central government from its citizens and encourage disassociation and corruption in Maputo.

In spite of the valid criticisms voiced by detractors of Neo-Liberalism – who point to an economy increasingly dependent on foreign trade, loans, and exposed to foreign pressures and domestic co-option – the current system may actually serve to ensure that democracy remains a driving force in the Mozambican political arena.

Michel Foucault's attack on civil society is useful for an understanding of CSO involvement in Mozambican politics. CS is typically understood to inhabit an arena separate from government involvement but still linking the private sphere to the public one. Foucault criticised the idea of civil society "...as a bridge between the public and private sectors," as he felt that CSOs could just as easily determine the "...purposes and rules of the political game" (Harbeson, 1994, p. 21). Although not all sectors of Mozambican civil society fit within Foucault's observations, the necessary involvement of CSOs in the country's CNE does call into question the independence of those CSOs – especially when the members of civil society organisations (such as Arão Litsure from Protestant CCM) are appointed to head the CNE.

Gramsci's perception that civil society "...cooption seems to sustain [a] government" supports Foucault's point that cooption may preclude the existence of a truly independent CS (Harbeson, 1994, p. 19). Although

Mozambican civil society has not been entirely co-opted by the government, the fact that CSOs are expected to play an integral role in the electoral process does suggest that Mozambique's CS arena is best described by the Gramscian acknowledgement of the utility of CS cooption. Despite Foucault's worries about civil society impartiality, civil society oversight continues to reduce the chances of a violent relapse. Although certain CSOs have renounced a degree of objectivity and independence by participating in the CNE deliberations, many others (including 48 local NGOs in Maputo and Nampula alone, identified by UNESCO in a 2002 report), such as the *Associação Rural de Alívio e Combate a Pobreza* (ARCAP), remain firmly outside of the government's arena and work to alleviate the effects of economic stagnation and internecine conflict (Bellucci, 2002).

What of the criticisms of the 'Mozambican Miracle'?

Robert Calderisi, in his book entitled *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*, argues that Mozambique is one of the few African states that is deserving of continued foreign aid as it has a developing political system, low levels of corruption, and a "self-directed" foreign aid policy (Calderisi, 2006). Calderisi's positive portrayal of Mozambique is perhaps overly optimistic. In his article entitled "Africa: Living on the Fringe", Samir Amin describes Third World 'miracles' – which are actually cases of growth without true development – as misleading monikers (Amin, 2002).

Despite Calderisi's praise, the 2007/2008 UNDP Human Development Report and its accompanying Human Development Indicators reveal that fifteen years after the end of the civil war, Mozambique still languishes amongst the group of countries with the 'Lowest Human Development' in the world (UNDP, 2008). At the conclusion of the civil war, when it was considered one of the poorest states in the world, Mozambique also sat firmly amongst the poorest performing states within the 'Low Human Development' bracket. By 1992, Mozambique ranked 146th out of 160 countries (UNDP, 1992) – it now sits at 172nd out of 177 countries (UNDP, 2008).

It is certain that Mozambique is still in the throes of its post-conflict reconstruction and development phase. What is also clear is that it has an ample civil society arena with widely varying CSOs. Despite the fact that some of the organisations are less independent of the government than others, the country's CSOs have played a significant role in Mozambique's transition to independence, peace in 1992, and along its path to post-conflict recovery.

As good governance continues to be an issue, it remains to be seen if the arena for civil society will continue to be amplified and encouraged (de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). As the Mozambican economy comes under growing foreign pressure and the political arena continues to grow, the question is whether FRELIMO will tolerate increasing civil society scrutiny and a gradual loss of sovereign authority, or if it will act to undermine civil society in order to maintain its grip on power. The effect of such a violation of the civil arena would undoubtedly lead to a renewal of hostilities.

A future study may be needed to shed light on RENAMO's role in the guaranteeing of the civil arena. The question is, as RENAMO remains a powerful political force, will FRELIMO hesitate to restrain the country's CSOs and compress the civil societal arena? If FRELIMO's support diminishes, will it, like RENAMO, rely on the country's civil society groups to counter-balance RENAMO's political power? Until these questions are answered, a politically-enfranchised – and consequently co-opted – civil society forms the anchor of the *Mozambican Miracle*.

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